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Natural ethics and informed consent 
 
 
Robert D. Hinshelwood 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper I examine one way in which psychoanalysis could 
contribute a natural ethics based on the inherent psychological 
development of a moral conscience.  Psychoanalytic object-
relations theories postulate the fundamental relational nature of 
human beings, and therefore the correlated concerns about the 
well-being of others.  The notion of unconscious projective 
identification central to some theories provides an ethic of 
integration. 
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Ética natural e consentimento livre e esclarecido 
 
 
RESUMO 
Nesse artigo eu examino uma forma através da qual a 
psicanálise poderia contribuir com uma ética natural baseada 
no desenvolvimento psicológico inerente à  consciência moral. 
As teorias psicanalíticas das relações de objeto postulam a 
fundamental natureza relacional dos seres humanos e, por 
conseguinte, sua correlata preocupação com o bem-estar dos 
outros. A noção de identificação projetiva inconsciente, central 
em algumas teorias, oferece uma ética de integração. 
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Freud (1921a) was unimpressed with Putnam’s attempts (PUTNAM, 1921) to tie 
psychoanalytic evidence to a strict sexual morality.  He was scathing of ethical principles 
based on religious belief (FREUD, 1930).  He expressed doubt  
 
as to which of the countless philosophical systems should be accepted, since they all 
seemed to rest on an equally insecure basis, and …  [wished] to wait, and to discover 
whether a particular attitude towards life might be forced upon us with all the weight 
of necessity by analytical investigation itself (FREUD, 1921a, p. 270) 
 
 
As an experimental psychology, psychoanalysis, he believed, shared a 
‘weltanshauung’ with natural science (FREUD, 1933).  He thought there was, to date, no 
‘natural’ ethics, which could be grounded in the nature of human beings; and if there was to 
be one it would emerge from psychoanalysis.  But he was ever hopeful that psychoanalysis 
would reform every branch of knowledge. 
 
Natural ethics:  Instead, Freud contented himself with what he thought of as a 
scientific investigation of, and data on, the ethical systems that operate within human beings 
(notably the super-ego).  The theory of the super-ego is one which explains how people 
acquire ethical systems – not which ethical system they will acquire.   
 
In the following, I briefly point to a way in which psychoanalysis can indicate 
'which ethical system'1.  It is not in fact impossible for psychoanalysis to generate ethical 
principles.  But that requires a little journey beyond Freud himself.  One of the major 
developments in psychoanalytic ideas since Freud, has been the theories of ‘object-relations’2.  
Those theories hold a promise for ethics in their fundamental notion that human beings seek 
others to relate to (FAIRBAIRN, 1952).  Psychoanalytic work then involves investigation of 
human relations, and their development from ‘immature’ forms to ‘maturity’.  This model has 
the opportunity then to describe ethical relations as psychologically mature ones – or to put it 
                                                 
1Expanded in Therapy of Coercion: Does Psychoanalysis Differ from Coercion (HINSHELWOOD, 1997). 
2In this brief paper I will concern myself largely with the theories of Melanie Klein, rather than for instance 
Winnicott and Balint, and the recent American inter-subjectivist schools, as well as the ethical investigations of 
Lacan. 
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succinctly, ethical relations are ‘healthy’ relations.  Right actions towards other people can be 
described in terms of psychologically mature relations. 
 
Much is begged in this assertion.  For instance, one possible charge against this 
psychologising of ethics is that an object-relations view of maturity is itself based on current 
ethical principles, leading to a circular argument.  However this is not so, as object relations 
psychoanalysis does not simply endorse current ethical principles.  Instead it goes beyond 
them and comes to novel judgements about ethical principles.  It does so in the following 
way. 
 
Our cultural expectations (since Mill 1859) increasingly require ethical 
judgements of right behaviour towards each other to conform to the principle of allowing each 
other maximum freedom – known as autonomy.   
 
In fact, object-relations theories do not necessarily, and simply, reconfirm the pre-
eminence of autonomy as the priority principle in ethics.  Quite the contrary, object-relations 
theory as I have argued, (HINSHELWOOD, 1997) show the simple notion of autonomy to be 
inadequate.  Holmes and Lindley (1998), for instance claim that "autonomy and dependence 
are not contradictory" (p. 6); and they are led to postulate a category they call 'emotional 
autonomy', and a mature form of dependence which is called interdependence by Winnicott 
(1971).   
 
This argument from the work of object-relations psychoanalysts which 
undermines the ordinary view of autonomy, is joined by a much more serious problem with 
the ordinary meaning of 'freedom of choice'; and I shall concentrate on the latter below.  Such 
psychoanalytic theories therefore call into question the contemporary socio-cultural 
requirement for autonomy.  Then, since an object-relations ethics stems from observations of 
actual human relating, it could be deemed to present, or partially present, a naturalised form 
of ethics3. 
                                                 
3Typically the naturalisation of knowledge (e.g. Spenserian sociology, or contemporary sociobiology) is to gain a 
'value-free' perspective.  To counter that, and to recover value in human affairs, it is necessary to lay bare the 
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Consent for treatment:  What constitutes consent for treatment, and informed 
consent4, is psychoanalytically a problem (Hinshelwood).  Yet it is central to medical ethics, 
and the ethics of psychoanalysis tends to follow medicine in this respect.  Conventionally, the 
ethical injunction runs thus: the patient is entitled to be informed fully of the nature of a 
treatment offered and its consequences.  Then, armed with this knowledge he decides to have 
the treatment, or not, a decision that is made in conjunction with a doctor who is willing to 
prescribe the treatment (GILLON, 1986). 
 
One problem in practice is that the amount of intelligible information a patient can 
grasp (unless medically trained him/herself) will be limited.  But, more interesting for 
ethicists, the notion of consent implies a capacity in the patient for rational thought.  It is clear 
that not all patients are so capable, and those include a large category of psychiatric patients 
(although it also includes, people with organic dementias, brain damage, drug intoxication, 
etc.).  It turns out that the notion of autonomy, and of consent for treatment which rests on 
autonomy, is conditional upon the key assessment of the level of rationality – or of 
irrationality as some insist (CULVER; GERT, 1982).  So, it is clear that in this respect, the 
important ethical principle (autonomy) rests on a certain level of normal psychological 
functioning.   
 
These problems are normally manageable in a professional practice.  However, it 
is also true that particularly psychoanalysis has taken on the understanding of irrationality, 
and has established that irrationality is a fundamental aspect of human mental functioning 
(see, for instance, Lear’s account of Freud’s case of the Ratman, Chapter 5 in Lear 1998).  
Freud called it the primary process5 in which time and the ordinary rules of reasoning do not 
apply, it forms a non-logical thinking which underlies all higher mental function.  Hence the 
test of rationality (or irrationality) is suspect. 
                                                                                                                                                        
hidden values that are employed in various natural science projects (see for instance the Journal Science as 
Culture).  However this present argument is a strategy that naturalise ethics, and thus places value within the 
natural world. 
4This was the starting point for my earlier investigations (HINSHELWOOD, 1997). 
5Basic psychoanalytic concepts can be clarified by reference to Sandler, Dare and Holder (1973) 
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Individuality and the divided mind:  More than this there is a problem in the whole 
conception of the individual.  If our culture tends to promote the idea of a single discrete and 
bounded individual, who is the locus of autonomous decisions.  But, it is difficult to sustain 
that ideal, when considering people in actuality.  Feud quoted LeBon (1895) to the effect that 
 
Whoever be the individuals that compose [the group], however like or unlike be 
their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact 
that they have been transformed into a group puts them in possession of a sort of 
collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different 
from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a 
state of isolation (quoted in FREUD, 1921b, p. 73). 
 
Though LeBon was writing about a crowd, without organisation, Freud went on to 
discuss similar alterations of the individual in the smallest of all groups, the couple.  He 
described the changes that occur in character when a person is under a trance with a hypnotist, 
when the capacity for personal independence and choice may be given over almost 
completely to the hypnotist.  Freud also considered the state of mind of when a person is in 
love who has a vary distorted view of reality (notably the loved one); and he related these 
alterations in the individual's freedom and sense of reality to what is known about the analyst 
and analysand couple.  
 
Freud, in fact, has been responsible for a major incursion into the idea of the 
indivisible individual.  He described the division of the mind into conscious and unconscious, 
and how those parts of the mind work against each other (DILMAN, 1984).  This, the deepest 
layer of mental conflict, means that the choice involved in consent for treatment (as, in fact, 
all choices) is not simply at the conscious level of the pros and cons which the doctor will 
have explained to the patient.   
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This unconscious component is never more clear than in the choice to consent to a 
psychoanalytic treatment.  In their book on the values of psychotherapy, Holmes and Lindley 
(1998) asserted that “Co-operation is the essence of psychotherapy” (p. xvii); and so it is, a 
psychoanalysis cannot proceed except on the basis of the voluntary agreement of the patient.  
But that is only part of the story, since, as soon as a psychoanalytic treatment starts, the 
patient shows ‘resistances’.  They are, by and large, from the ‘unconscious’, resistance sits 
side by side with the patient’s conscious belief recognition of the benefits of a psychoanalysis. 
 
The patient is not of one mind.  Nor is he properly aware of the conflict in himself 
if one side of the conflict is unconscious.  So, if some of his motivation is unconscious, he 
cannot make a conscious and autonomous choice from the alternatives.  This poses a real 
problem to the notion of autonomy as ordinarily understood (LINDLEY, 1986).   
 
Splitting:  The matter worsens with Freud’s descriptions, late in his career, of 
splitting of the ego (FREUD, 1940).  In that instance there is not even a conflict between the 
conscious and unconscious minds.  The split off part of the mind is no longer part of the 
organised whole.  Melanie Klein advanced the descriptions of this splitting of the mind, 
showing that in many instances the split-off part of the mind could be transferred into, felt as 
part of another mind; that is, as part of the mind of another person.  For instance, a man with a 
particularly macho self-image may be unduly hostile to those he regards as gay because of his 
fear of his own affection for men; they are in effect hostile to that affectionate part of 
themselves, seen as the other6. This is known as projective identification (KLEIN, 1946).  
Then that part projected into the other, may be actually ‘owned’ by that receiving other 
(SANDLER, 1976; see HINSHELWOOD, 1997, Chapters 5, 6, and 7, for illustrations of this 
peculiar unconscious phenomenon).  The result is a conflict in which the patient is 
antipathetic to his psychoanalytic treatment (known as a negative transference) whilst and the 
analyst who holds the positive motivation for both of them, continues to persuade the patient 
of the benefits of psychoanalysis.  
                                                 
6Another instance might be how Hitler’s own violent ambitions to take over the world was seen by him as in the 
Jews and as their conspiracy for world domination; he could then attempt to exterminate it, in them. 
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In other medical treatments, too, responsibility is passed over to staff from 
patient's who might more rationally retained it: 
 
The hospital, particularly the nurses, must allow the projection into them of such 
feelings as depression and anxiety, fear of the patient and his illness, disgust at the 
illness and necessary nursing tasks.  Patients and relatives treat the staff in such a 
way as to ensure that the nurses experience these feelings instead of – or partly 
instead of – themselves: for example by refusing or trying to refuse to participate in 
important decisions about the patient and so forcing responsibility and anxiety back 
on the hospital.  Thus to the nurses’ own deep and intense anxieties are psychically 
added those of other people concerned (MENZIES, 1959, p. 49). 
 
 
This describes a redistribution of responsibility in a general hospital with 
ordinary, mentally healthy patients and staff.  Similarly, Conran (1985) also saw a 
redistribution of responsibility into hospital staff occurring with mentally healthy patients as 
well as psychotic ones.  He elegantly described its location in a case of appendicitis and one 
of manic-depression.  These empirical observations confirm the general point that human 
personalities can be divided and redistributed within the social field.  The problem is general 
for the professions and in psychoanalytic treatments. 
 
 Practice and integration:  Given the fact that people are not of one mind, and 
that mental parts are ‘socially mobile’, the problem of personal autonomy increases.  If the 
analyst, for a while, represents, and in an existential sense, is the patient’s consent for 
treatment, we cannot rely on the simple tests of rationality and autonomy to decide on ethical 
practice.  There is a real problem: Whose consent for treatment. 
 
In psychoanalytic work, we actually investigate these irrational disruptions, not 
merely disruptions to reasoning, but to individuality, autonomy and decision-making.  Thus a 
projection of responsibility or motivation into the analyst can confuse the genuine autonomy 
of either partner.  This level of human relating is normally beneath consciousness.  Since 
ethics is the prescription of right forms of relating, it cannot ignore these problems revealed 
by psychoanalysis. 
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Autonomy is therefore a subverted principle because decision-making capacities 
of the individual have been separated and redistributed though the interpersonal field of 
others.  In the light of this degradation of autonomy the nature of ethical action can be recast 
as the degree to which one person will enhance or reverse splitting processes.  We can 
therefore define this as a principle of integration.  This does not completely replace the 
principle of autonomy, since integration (or the integrity of the person, in this sense) underlies 
autonomy, and makes it a secondary or derivative consequence of integration. 
 
At the same time the task of reversing those separations - or at the very least not 
enhancing them, is the activity of a psychoanalysis itself.  We must, in an analysis, investigate 
the relational context in the work itself – the transference and countertransference, or the way 
that analyst and patient act upon each other.  So, if ethics is the study of the right action of one 
person towards another, so is a psychoanalysis; and the ethics of psychoanalysis in a 
meaningful way becomes the psychoanalysis of ethics.  The practice of psychoanalysis is 
simply the practice of ethics, and an ethical system becomes naturalised as the product of a 
scientific practice. 
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